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The question of a dignified death is raised anew against the advancements in
medical technology that provide the means to maintain human life. There is fear
that in face of technology the possibility for a dignified death maybe diminished.
Protecting human dignity means being able to remove medicine's unnatural
obstacles to death. The focus of the discussion, however, is not to assume that a
"natural" death is more worthy of the human person. That is clearly a naive
position; not providing available medical means to a suffering person may
certainly compromise human dignity as much as the excessive use of those
means. The discussion, rather, has turned on freedom's ability to choose the
manner and time of one's death. Can the freedom that persons enjoy over nature
be extended even to the time and manner of death? Can the self-disposing of
human life ever be a reasonable, responsible, and dignified act or does it
necessarily entail an encroachment of God's dominion over life?
The purpose of this article is to delineate the meaning of a dignified death
within the Roman Catholic moral tradition including some of the Magisterium's
most recent statements. Providing a more accurate hermeneutic of what
constitutes a dignified death will expand the discussion beyond the demand of
human autonomy and freedom from excessive or futile technology. From a
Catholic perspective, a dignified death will include the knowledge that death is
approaching and one's treatment choices will be respected, the confidence that
one will not suffer useless pain or be abandoned by friends and family, and the
opportunity to be reconciled with one's life project.
Before deconstructing the meaning of a dignified death, some observations can
be made concerning the character of Christian morality. These considerations
will provide the background from which to approach the issue of death with
dignity as it confronts contemporary society.
First, Christian morality is not understood as a system of prescriptions and
proscriptions requiring the submissive obedience of the believer. Moral norms
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are not ends in themselves but reveal a conception of human flourishing and
dignity which they tacitly embody; norms are messengers of the meaning of
human flourishing. In this way, moral norms have a prophylactic role. Like the
walls of a medieval city which guaranteed the protection of the citizens, moral
norms protect an underlying vision of human dignity which does not exclude
suffering, self-sacrifices, or solidarity with those in need. This vision or horizon is
the hermeneutical key to unlock the meaning of the behavior a norm proscribes
or prescribes. This horizon which contains assumptions about human life,
suffering, and death is specified, extended, and deciphered through moral
reasoning and the pastoral practice of the Church. In a way, this horizon provides
the background grammar which structures meaningful discourse about a human
and dignified death. To forget that the inner-worldly behavior sanctioned or
prohibited by a moral norm embodies a more original vision of human
flourishing is to work with a truncated notion of the reasoning process.
Secondly, moral norms cannot be limited to prescriptive language - what we
should and should not do - but must open up to the narrative language of the
community. When speaking about the topic of euthanasia (literally a "good" or
"easy" death) this characteristic of the moral norm has a particular importance.
In face of human suffering and the experience of death, normative language gives
way to the invitation to enter into solidarity with a brother or sister in need. The
compassion and care of the believing community for the sick and dying will be an
eloquent testimony to the meaning of Christian living. The compassion and
solidarity with those facing their fragility and mortality will be evidence to the
communitarian character of Christian ethics.

1. Christian Anthropology and Moral Reasoning
The starting point for Christian moral reasoning is reason illuminated by faith
(DS. 3006). The introduction of a religious voice to the discussion on euthanasia
does not mean a simplistic or naive use of Scripture. The tradition of natural law
argumentation guards against any moral proscription being grounded on biblical
authority (Gen. 9:6; Dt. 5:17). The autonomous nature of moral reasoning
protects the moral law from being imposed heteronomously by even a divine
authority.) Faith does not replace the need for study and reflection; faith does not
suppress our rational capabilities. Nevertheless, any conception of moral
reasoning that is sensitive to the exigencies of contemporary philosophy will
understand the autonomy of moral reasoning as a relational autonomy. This
means that as informed by faith, moral reasoning is always embedded in a more
original narrative or context. The creed is effective at this deeper level. What we
profess and believe ([utes quae) acts as a presupposition to our reason in a way
that it conditions and stimulates reason. Our faith sensitizes reason to perceive
moral values. This approach is seen most clearly in the new Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services where the Bishops introduce the
individual chapters with a narrative that "provides the context in which concrete
issues can be discussed from the perspective of the Catholic faith." Only then
are the directives given " which promote and protect the truths
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of the Catholic faith as those truths are brought to bear on concrete issues in
health care."2
There are a number of presuppositions that stem from the Christian creed and
which come into play in the discussion surrounding our obligations to the sick
and dying. While not providing any concrete norm, these presuppositions help
identify relevant problems and point the direction in which moral reflection will
go to find adequate solutions. They constitute the cognitive matrix in which
moral reasoning works.
First, there is the recognition of the indestructible dignity of the person. The
religious warrant for human dignity is the creation account in Genesis I :26 where
humankind is created in the image of God. Human dignity is not merited; it
cannot be forfeited by sin; it is not diminished by sickness; it cannot be revoked by
society or the will of the individual. Human dignity entails a respect for another
that frees her from the fear of any kind of arbitrary manipulation by others.
Secondly, there is the recognition of the equality of all persons. The warrant for
this claim is the Incarnation where, by becoming us, Christ renders us equal (Gal.
3:28). The Incarnation also gives a new quality to human solidarity. God's
nearness to us is shown in our willingness to draw near to each other.
A third presupposition that will guide the moral practice of the Christian
community is the conviction that death is not a catastrophe to be avoided at all
costs. For the Christian death is not an insoluble puzzle. Christ's death has put
death to death (1 Cor. 15:56). His resurrection has removed the veil of absurdity
from human history. Through death the Christian enters eternal life (Rom. 6:23).
Belief in the resurrection anchors the Christian's sense of hope in the face of
suffering and death. Because death is anticipated and integrated into one's daily
life, the Christian can embrace death serenely as the culmination of life.

2. Teaching and Practice of the Church
Within the Catholic tradition, life is a fundamental good. Life is the basis for
the enjoyment for all other hman goods. At the same time, because life is not an
absolute good, it need not be maintained at all costs or by all technological means
available.
What is proscribed absolutely by the Church is "an action or an omission
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in this
way be eliminated."3 In condemning the direct killing of oneself or another
because that life is seen as absurd, the Catholic tradition also recognizes that death
must not be staved off at all costs. Even within a theological anthroplogy that
integrates suffering into the mystery of Christ's death and resurrection, the
Catholic tradition recognizes that suffering can become futile, excessive, and
offensive to human dignity; the tradition does not degenerate into a cult of
suffering. Catholic normative reasoning moves between these two extremes:
human life is never regarded as meaningless even in its final and most vulnerable
stages, but the technology used to maintain human life can be regarded at times as
meaningless or useless.
The Christian affirmation of life and the recognition of the appropriateness of
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death stand behind the Church's traditional nomenclature of extraordinary and
ordinary means of treatment to maintain life. 4 The obligation to utilize ordinary
means of treatment implies that an individual may forgo or omit treatment
procedures when the burdens outweigh the benefits. The Declaration on
Euthanasia nuanced the traditional terminology when it spoke of proportionate
and disproportionate means of medical treatment. This is also the language used
in the new Catechism and the new Directives. 5 Whatever the language, however,
the criterion for determining proportionate and disproportionate means is the
integral well-being of the patient. Means of life support are proportionate or
disproportionate relative to the condition of the patient. In the traditional
manuals of moral theology, a variety of factors were offered to guide the
prudential judgment of the patient: the reasonable hope of recovery, the ability to
interact in familiar surroundings, the bearable level of pain and discomfort, and
the tolerable hardship or inconvenience entailed in the provision oflife support. 6
What is clear in the tradition is that the guiding criterion is not the state of
medical science or technology alone. If that were the case, what is ordinary today
was extraordinary yesterday, and what is extraordinary today will be ordinary
tomorrow. Of course, technological advancements may imply new obligations.
Advancements in the treatment of an illness obviously diminish the risks and
burden involved and offer the hope of greater therapeutic benefits. In other
words, the determination of proportionate or disproportionate means of
treatment will be flexible.
A subtle but real threat to the Catholic tradition is that society has come to
understand the most advanced medical technology as ordinary and
commonplace. Technology is taken for granted in a way that was unimaginable a
generation ago. This attitude has the tendency to restrict rather than refine the
retrieval of the Catholic moral tradition and its application in a contemporary
context. In a technological society, the duty to maintain life can be equated with
the use of all available technology to maintain life; death occurs when technology
has reached its limit; death becomes a medical failure. But to use technology in an
uncritical way - that is regardless of the patient's condition - is to make an idol of it
and risks turning the patient into an object. Such a naive use of technology,
ironically, will have the tendency to reinforce initiatives for physician-assisted
suicide. As a reaction to an uncritical use of technology, initiatives for physicianassisted suicide unfortunately will be interpreted as a way of safeguarding the
patient from manipulation. Within the Roman Catholic tradition, the object of
offering or withdrawing medical technology is to allow the dying to live their
final stages of life with human and Christian dignity.
To this end, what is offered to the patient cannot be limited to the technological
or medical means to support life or relieve physical pain. "Assistance" offered to
the sick and dying will include human solidarity and compassion (Lk.! 0:25-38).
The goal of treatment is not merely to relieve pain, but to humanize suffering. The
Willingness ofthe community to draw close to those who are dying broadens the
moral discussion about a dignified death to include the interpersonal aspects of
human suffering and care. This means that the measure of Christian praxis will
not be the technology that can be offered to the suffering and dying, but the
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compassion and love provided for those who experience in their suffering and
dying the limitations of the human condition. 7 The trust, love and support so
necessary for human living is a necessity for human dying as well. As solitary as
death will be, it does not mean that we should die alone. When disproportionate
means of treatment are withdrawn or withheld, the dying patient is not
abandoned; the logic guiding the obligation to humanize suffering shifts from
therapy to care.
In this context, the preparations that a dying person may make to take his own
life or his request to have a physician or nurse remedy pain by terminating life
-far from being an act of freedom or self-determination - can be interpreted as
an "anguished plea for help and love."8 The challenge to the Christian
community is to create the conditions wherein the person does not have to gain
meaning by choosing death. There is a mutually conditioning relationship
between law and culture. What we need are not merely laws prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide, but we need to create what John Paul II has named in
his recent Encyclical The Gospelo/Life, a "culture of life." We must see that the
request to have one's life terminated by another can signal the moral failure ofthe
community to support the dying in their last stages of life, and to provide meaning
to the fragility of human existence. Such persons feel abandoned. In an
environment where the dying experience themselves as isolated and far from
human solidarity, and where they are not offered any purpose to their suffering,
they are even more susceptible to suggestions of "physician assisted" suicide.
When such a tragedy occurs, then, the moral condemnation should not be
directed to the physician or the patient alone, but the community that has lost its
sense of human solidarity with the weakest and most vulnerable members of
society.
The witness of religious communities of men and women provides a rich
insight into the meaning of a dignified death. Health care communities of
religious take time to gather with a dying sister and help her prepare for an
impending death. Community members stay with her around the clock; they
pray with her, and comfort her with Scripture, poetry and songs. The room ofthe
dying becomes like a chapel. The others allow the dying sister the opportunity to
take stock of life, to be forgiven her transgressions, and to make final farewells.
The example of the religious teaches us that one should not fear the inevitable
confrontation with death; one should fear, rather, being unprepared for death,
dying unreconciled with one's life choices, and dying alone and isolated from
human love.
The witness of such religious communities introduce a necessary corrective
into the discussion about the right to die which is often contextualized within the
assumption that the freedom to choose is tantamount to human dignity. In its
turn, this conception of freedom is based on a decidedly modern epistemology
which emphasizes personal autonomy.9 Within this scheme, moral problems are
defined in terms of the restrictions on freedom or the impairment of autonomy.
The witness of the Christian community does not question the right to die; it
questions the validity of the modern project which sees dependency on others and
human dignity as antithetical.
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The Church realizes that burdens of caring for a dying family member also
must be taken into consideration when evaluating the means of treatment. Each
family will face definite limits - not merely financial but psychological and
moral - to the care that they can provide to a dying loved one. Here again is an
opportunity for the community's support to humanize suffering in face of the
growing technological possibilities to prolong life. Concretely, the hospice
movement and parish nurse program are examples of care not only for the
terminally ill, allowing the individual to remain in familial surroundings, but also
examples of communal support for the families who otherwise would not be able
to provide this kind of care on their own. By supporting these kinds of programs
and initiatives, the ecclesial community can provide a high standard of care to be
imitated. A Christian ethic will be characterized by its sensitivity to those who
suffer; the sick and dying should find a privileged place within the Christian
community. The Christian vision of human dignity not only includes the ability
to accept suffering and to transform it by the light of faith, but also the ability to
bear the sufferings of one another generously and compassionately.
Excessive expense to the family or community can also be a factor in judging
certain means to be extraordinary or disproportionate. An individual has a
responsibility not to invest the financial resources of the family in treatment or
technology disproportionate to the anticipated results. lo It oftens happens that
when a family is not able to pay for a potentially beneficial treatment, public
support is mobilized to assist the family. Such cases even may provoke the
development of new criterion of resource allocation or new forms of health care
delivery in order to prevent similar cases from becoming commonplace. Publicly
established limits to medical treatment, however, must done in a way that does
not entail the further marginalization of those most in need.

3. The Professional-Patient Relationship
The teaching of the Church underlines the fundamental right to life of every
human person. II A person should be certain that the right to life is respected and
that no one presumes the authority to abrogate it. The ethos of the medical
profession is built around the obligation to maintain and protect human life.
Upon this professional duty is built the patient's trust to receive medical care in a
human and dignified way. Advancements in medical technology do not cast this
professional duty into doubt; increasing technological control over human life in
its most fragile and vulnerable moments, however, raises questions of the scope
and limits of this duty.
The duty to maintain life should not compromise other responsibilities that the
physician has toward the patient. This means that the right to life does not exhaust
the professional-patient relationship. The physician'S duty to maintain life is
balanced with the duty to relieve pain, even when doing so will shorten the
patient's lifeP Naturally, persons will have different levels of tolerance for
physical pain, but no one is bound to a heroic measure of endurance. It is fully in
accord with the Catholic tradition for a physician to administer analgesics to
alleviate pain even though their administration may quicken the patient's death.
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Though the phenomenal structure entails the taking of human life, the loss oflife
does not exhaust the moral meaning of the act. The physician does not intend the
death of the patient; the moral object of the act is pain control. This is an
acceptable application of the traditional principle of the double effect.
Effective pain management also enters into the discussion on physicianassisted suicide. At this level of the discussion, the "right to die" no longer means
the patient's freedom to relinquish disproportionate means, but the physician'S
ability to help end the lives of ill patients suffering intolerably. In arguing by
analogy, there is oftentimes a similarity drawn with the case of a fatally wounded
soldier requesting to be shot in order to avoid a more agonizing death. 13 It is quite
true that no one should suffer a physically painful death, but the tragedy of the
mortally wounded soldier should not be over interpreted. In this case, the taking
of life is done precisely because there are no other alternatives. The question is
how comparable this case is to the contemporary medical situation? What are the
relevant similarities to the professional-patient relationship? The purpose of
effective pain management is to guarantee adequate relief to the dying.
In addition to the duties to maintain life and to relieve pain, the physician has
the responsibility to insure - as much as possible - that the dying patient remains
conscious and aware of his or her surroundings. 14 The patient has the right to
embrace death while still alert and cognizant. A dying patient should not be
deprived of consciousness or the ability to communicate with care providers,
family, or friends merely for the sake of prolonging life. This duty serves the
humanization of an individual's suffering and protects the patient from an
uncritical and abusive use of technology.
The professional-patient relationship is a human relationship based on
confidence and trust. The patient has the right to truthful information about his or
her condition. The duty to provide this information will depend upon the ability
of the patient to receive it. The responsibility to provide this information,
however, does not fall upon the physician alone. The patient oftentimes will need
emotional, psychological and spiritual support. Hence, there must be
collaboration between health care providers, the family of the patient, and
pastoral care providers. A patient unprepared for death may meet an unfavorable
diagnosis and prognosis with anger, resistance and denial. Conversely, the more
prepared a person is to face death, the easier will be the sharing of information
about that person's condition. Learning the truth about one's condition will be
experienced as a relief and an invitation to prepare for death. While the truth
should be told to a patient in a compassionate and, at times, in a gradual way, to
withhold the truth from a patient is a subtle hegemony over the patient; it is a
form of paternalism.
Knowing the truth of one's condition serves the individual's freedom. As the
Bishops write, the information to which a patient is entitled includes "all
reasonable information about the essential nature of the proposed treatment and
its benefits; its risks, side-effects, consequences, and cost; and any reasonable and
morally legitimate alternatives, including no treatment at all."15 This information
will be the basis for the informed consent of the patient. The free and informed
consent of the patient is to be respected.
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Although the informed decision of the patient binds the physician, this does
not mean that the physician is obligated to cooperate with the patient with
treatment contrary to the physician's moral or professional standards. The
physician preserves the right to her own conscience.

4. Promoting Human Dignity in Cases of Doubt
Cases of doubt are solved throguh what are known as moral systems. The
moral systems provide the agent with the practical certainty needed to act in a
responsible way. Among the various moral systems are probabilism and
tutiorism. The moral system of probabilism holds that a solidly probable opinion
is sufficient to solve the doubt in favor of liberty. The guiding principle is qui
probabiliter agit prudenter agit. On the other hand, the moral system of tutiorism
holds that in cases of doubt, even when there is an opinion for liberty, one acts
responsibly when the safer course is followed. Where the fundamental good of
life is concerned, as in the care for the dying, one proceeds in a tutioristic manner.
Tutiorism, however, should not be understood naively or simplistically.
Tutiorism does not mean that life must be protected and maintained at all costs.
Tutiorism does not mean rigorism; it does not make the maintenance of human
life absolute at the expense of other goods to be considered. Tutiorism refers to
the certainty of diagnosis and prognosis so that health care decisions can serve the
patient's right to die with human and Christian dignity.
There is no doubt that in an emergency situation a physician will act in a
prudent way by initiating treatment with the hope of its success. Yet the
praesumptio cedit veritati and tretment may reach the limit of its purpose. When,
for instance, continued treatment would only mean a miserable state of life, or
put the patient in a state where she would not recognize family members or
familiar surroundings, or life would be maintained in a permanently comatose
state, a prudent and responsible course of action could be the withdrawal or
withholding of treatment. This freedom need not be questioned in those cases
when a patient is still competent to decide or when an individual has left explicit
and written wishes to this effect in an advance medical directive. The more
difficult case is when the wishes of the patient are unknown or when he is not
competent; then the decision falls upon the family in consultation with health
care providers. As the Bishops state, "decisions ... should be faithful to Catholic
moral principles and to the person's intentions and values, or if the person's
intentions are unknown, to the person's best interests."16

5. Casuistry Surrounding a Recent Dilemma
One question that has emerged recently is whether there are means of life
support that are always to be provided regardless of the condition ofthe patient?
Some Catholic bishops have addressed the issue of artificially administered
nutrition and hydrationP All are guided by the Church's teaching prohibiting
euthanasia. There is also universal agreement that hydration and nutrition are not
morally obligatory when they bring no comfort to a patient who is imminently
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dying or when the patient's body cannot assimilate them. There is no consensus,
however, concerning whether it is morally permissible to withdraw artifically
administered nutrition and hydration when the person is in a persistent vegetative
state. In the recent Ethical and Religious Directives, the body of Bishops steer a
cautious and middle course when they write,
there should be a presumption in favor of providing nutrition and hydration to all
patients, including patients who require medically assisted nutrition and hydration, as
long as this is of sufficient benefit to outweigh the burdens involved to the patient. 18

Rather than dispute the casuistry that surrounds this issue, it may be more
helpful to recall recent studies on the relationship between language and
thought. 19 Those studies have drawn attention to the fact that problem-setting
precedes problem-solving in a way that draws attention to what is labeled "the
cognitive function" of language. By looking at the language which sculptures a
problem, or in this case, the metaphors we use to describe the person in a
persistent vegetative state, the attention will shift from problem-solving to the
cognitive taxonomy created by language which guides moral reasoning in
weighing the burdens and benefits of treatment.
Oftentimes, it is said that to remove nutrition and hydration from a person in a
persistent vegetative state is to starve the person to death. There is a similarity
drawn between the person in a persistent vegetative state and someone who is
starving. This similarity erects a cognitive taxonomy. Clearly, if someone is
starving the obligation is to provide food and water. How nutrition and hydration
are provided is irrevelant. When the problem is confined to this metaphor, one
may even have recourse to the social teaching of the Church to underline the
obligation to provide food and water: "feed the man dying of hunger, because if
you have not fed him you have killed him." Surely, this is the most emotional
argument to provide nutrition and hydration to a patient in a persistent vegetative
state. Within this metaphor, providing nutrition and hydration can be nothing
other than a proportionate means to maintain life; withdrawing or withholding
them can be nothing other than forcing the patient to die. Consequently,the
meaning attributed to the act of withdrawing or withholding nutrition and
hydration is strictly circumscribed: it can be nothing other than the direct killing
of a patient through starvation and dehydration.20
A second metaphor sees the persistent vegetative state as a mental
impairment. 21 This is often used in tandem with the first conceptual schema. The
person in a persistent vegetative state is severely disabled and unable to feed
himself or herself. Within the conceptual horizon sketched by this metaphor,
there is no morally relevant difference between a coma, dementia, a persistent
vegetative state or any other disability. This language builds a conceptual schema
in which to remove nutrition and hydration from a PVS patient is not only a form
of neglect and abuse, but a form of discrimination against the disabled. Another
element within this conceptual network is the strict difference between treatment
and care: nutrition and hydration are normal care to be provided to every patient.
Proponents of this schema point out that nutrition and hydration do not treat an
illness but simply maintain life. To remove this ordinary care from a PVS patient is
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to say that the life of the mentally impaired patient is expendable. There is no
difference in the act of removing nutrition and hydration from an individual in a
persistent vegetative state and the intention of killing the individual. Admittedly
death is brought about by omitting nutrition and hydration, but such an omission
is really euthanasia in its intent. 22 Thus to argue for the removal or withholding of
nutrition and hydration from PVS patients is another step down the slippery
slope leading to the active causing of death.
No doubt, the conceptual schema set up by the metaphor which sees a
persistent vegetative state as a disability is guided by the duty to maintain life.
When tutiorism is invoked by this schema, the moral system means that one has
the duty to maintain physical life. The use of technology is unchecked as long as it
serves the continuation of physical life. Within this conceptual schema, because
the good to be achieved is the maintenance of life, the inability of the patient to
communicate or relate to one's surroundings is of little importance.
Consequently, the burden of the gastrointestinal tube is minimized since it does
not increase the physical suffering of the patient, can be monitored easily by a
nurse or trained person, and is not expensive.
The third possible metaphor sees patients in a persistent vegetative state as
dying. This metaphor sets up a broader conceptual schema in which to weigh the
benefits and burdens of treatment when compared with the other two
metaphors. 23 Within this context no one stage of the patient's condition is
isolated, but the patient's diagnosis and prognosis are set on a continuum which
moves from treatment aimed at recovery to the eventual futility of treatment
aimed at protecting human dignity. On this continuum, the inability to relate and
communicate with one's surroundings is a morally relevant factor in determining
the burdens and benefits of treatment. When tutiorism is invoked within this
topography, it refers to the certainty needed to diagnose a persistent vegetative
state, not to the duty to maintain life irrespective of the patient's condition. Not as
in the other schemata, this schema draws a clear line between a persistent
vegetative state and both a coma and dementia, but the line is less clearly defined
distinguishing care and treatment. This conceptual topography focuses less on
what is provided than who receives it and why.
When the patient in a persistent vegetative state is seen as dying, artificially
assisted nutrition and hydration are not maintained simply because their removal
would lead inevitably to death. The inevitability of death is not the determining
criterion ofthe disproportionality of treatment. Rather, the criterion judging the
proportionality of any treatment is the total well-being of the patient which
cannot be divorced from one's convictions about a meaningful life and a dignified
death. Against this background, technology is made to serve human ends which
transcend the mere maintenance of physical life. Within this schema, providing a
PVS patient with nutrition and hydration can be interpreted as burdensome by
virtue of its permanence; life without treatment is judged better than life with
treatment.
Furthermore, within the conceptual schema that sees the patient as dying, the
removing or withholding of nutrition and hydration takes on a new moral object.
The purpose of the action must be clear; removing or withholding nutrition and
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hydration is never done to leave the patient to die or to shorten the patient's life or
to discriminate against the disabled; the moral object of the action is to remove
from the patient a burdensome means of maintaining life. Removing treatment
does not signal a callous abandonment of the patient but an acceptance of the
human condition and the limits of meaningful treatment.

Conclusion
Though the "right to die" and "dying with dignity" have become political
slogans, they also can be used to guide the pastoral practice of the Church. In the
face of an unrelenting use of medical technology to maintain life, sometimes in
the name of the sanctity of life, the Church must protect the right to die with
human and Christian dignity. In an ecclesial context, however, the meaning of a
dignified death is given a deeper meaning than simply the ability to be made dead
by one's own choosing. Within the Catholic tradition, protecting a dignified
death means that the dying need to be assured that their lives will not be
arbitrarily shortened, that they will not have to suffer uselessly, that they will not
be subject to unreasonable and burdensome therapies, that medical technology
will be used for their integral well-being, that their free and informed decisions
will be respected, and that they will not be marginalized or abandoned by the
community in their dying.
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